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FOREWORD
EQUITY AND THE 1992 RIO EARTH SUMMIT
BENJAMIN A. GOLDMAN*
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, was the largest gathering ever
of world leaders, dealing with possibly the most complex global challenge
of the late Twentieth Century: how to achieve decent living conditions
for all members of the human species without destroying the natural ba-
sis for life on earth. Complicating matters further were the parallel
mega-conferences across town, which included the largest gathering of
environmentalists in history ("the Global Forum"), and a variety of sci-
entific and social movement conventions as well. All of this was taking
place in a country and city facing staggering, yet ever worsening, envi-
ronmental and economic crises.
Highly-educated environmentalists from northern industrialized coun-
tries debated the impacts of global warming as tens of thousands of carto-
cas (as Rio's residents are known) marched through the city, chanting
"what is the use of all this ecology if our people are oppressed and mas-
sacred," 1 while diplomats sped by in air-conditioned limousines under
the watchful eyes of machine gun-toting soldiers guarding the major
transportation arteries.
To appreciate fully what went on in Rio during those two weeks would
require a phenomenal understanding of recent world history, mastery of
a thousand pages of international agreements, expertise in environmen-
tal, economic, and legal issues and the ability to be in at least ten places
at once. Without such omniscience, suffice it to suggest that the clue to
understanding these multifarious happenings rests precisely in the tre-
mendous clash of perspectives that occurred at the Earth Summit of
1992.
One of the key goals of "sustainability," the Summit's underlying
theme linking environment with development, is reconciling the conflict-
Ing demands voiced by the thousands of envoys who came to Rio from
around the world. While concerns about international economic effi-
ciency in the face of devastating environmental destruction appeared to
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drive much of the debate at the Summit, the concept of sustainable devel-
opment is fundamentally a matter of distributive justice. The key issue
raised by the Sumnit's occurrence, even if never mentioned as an explicit
agenda item, is equity
I. DIMENSIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY
According to the Umted Nations World Commission on Environment
and Development (WCED), "sustainable development requires meeting
the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to fulfill their
aspirations for a better life. A world in which poverty is endemic will
always be prone to ecological and other catastrophes." 2 The principal
stumbling block at the Summit, yet key to achieving this goal, is the need
for agreement on various shifts between and within nations of decision-
making authority over financial, technical, and natural resources.
Among the many issues specifically addressed in this regard, but ulti-
mately left unresolved, were the needs to transfer financial aid from the
North to the South, to reallocate special kinds of property rights, and to
grant standing to representatives of civil and traditional societies.
At the very core of the concept of sustainable development, however,
is a clash of perspectives that is even less reconcilable than the significant
differences of opinon voiced in Rio. The notion of sustamability tries to
incorporate the views of individuals who did not attend the Earth Sum-
mit and who can never attend such a conference. According to the
WCED, "sustainable development is development that meets the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs." 3 In other words, so many people were brought to
Brazil in the summer of 1992 by the fundamental belief that our genera-
tion as a whole has a duty to respect the preferences of future genera-
tions, which are inherently unknown to us and will likely be as vaned.
Reconciling the clash of perspectives at the Earth Summit is thus not
only a matter of equitably distributing life-sustamng resources and op-
portunities across the rather exhaustive spectrum of social groups and
geographic areas represented at the various events in Rio. It is also a
matter of equitably distributing such resources and opportunities across
other generations and species, members of which were mcapable of par-
ticipating in Summit negotiations and yet are the first to face extinction if
the policies of those in attendance do not work.
The intent of this Article is not to update the implications of the Earth
Summit for international environmental law, but rather to indicate how
the events at the Earth Summit challenge all of us, whether attorneys or
not, to think about the related meanings of "sustainabiity" and "envi-
ronmental justice."
2. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON
FUTURE 8 (Oxford University Press 1987).
3. Id. at 43.
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II. PROCEDURAL EQuITy
There are two major components to the notion of environmental jus-
tice: procedural and impact equity The procedural component involves
the distribution of influence over policy formation and implementation.
The impact component involves the distribution of positive and negative
effects of public policies. Clearly, these equity components are interre-
lated. If certain parties lack standing in the policy-making process, for
example, then they are more likely to suffer disproportionately from ad-
verse policy impacts and are less likely to benefit from positive impacts.
The decision rules at the official UNCED negotiations would appear
on the surface to be remarkably equitable. Any nation could suggest text
for discussion, which was then bracketed if any other nation objected.
Agreement on bracketed text was sought during a series of four prepara-
tory comimttee meetings, with the more complex issues left to be decided
at Rio. This exhausting procedure resulted in agreement among 178 na-
tions on the text of four documents, achieved by consensus rather than
vote.4 The documents include: "Agenda 21,"1 a 900-page agenda cover-
Ing dozens of topics relevant to sustainable development; the "Rio Decla-
ration,"6 a shorter set of principles and shared aspirations; and the
Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions, 7 the only legally binding
agreements to come out of Rio, which must be signed by participating
nations.
Yet there is a flip side to this apparent equipollence. First, the arduous
process of compromise across so many competing viewpoints resulted in
a marked lack of concreteness, yielding what some observers have called
mere "zeppelins of moral rhetoric."' The lack of specificity and the ab-
sence even of the force of law for the vast majority of the agreed upon
language precludes most opportunities for realistic enforcement.
Second, while the procedures for reaching consensus may seem fair, a
key question remains: whose interests were represented at the bargaining
table? The legitimacy of governments - both North and South - is a para-
mount issue. Why should a Umted States President elected by just 25%
of his country's eligible voters be able to determine so much of the final
outcome for the world? The presidential host of the Summit, Brazil's
4. Nicholas C. Yost, Rio and the Road Beyond, 11 A.B.A. ENVTL. LAW, Summer
1992, at 1-6.
5. Adoption of Agreements on Environment and Development: Agenda 21, U.N. Con-
ference on Environment and Development, 4th Sess., Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.151/4 (1992).
6. Adoption ofAgreements on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on En-
vironment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, 4th
Sess., Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5 (1992).
7. Department of Public Information, United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development, CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE; CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL
DIVERSITY (June 1992) (on file with the Fordham Environmental Law Report).
8. Susanna Hecht & Alexander Cockburn, Rhetoric and Reality in Rio, THE NA-
TION, June 22, 1992, at 850.
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Fernando Collor de Mello, was under mimment threat of impeachment
for alleged corruption as these worldly proceedings ensued. Do the dele-
gates of these and other administrations farly represent the viewpoints of
the majority of the world's citizens? The very sovereignty of govern-
ments in developing countries falls into question amid collapsing econo-
mies, skyrocketing debt, and the harsh austerity measures imposed by
the International Monetary Fund. The rift between civil society and gov-
ernmental decision-making is exemplified no better than by the simulta-
neous official UNCED proceedings and the massive alternative Summit
called the "Global Forum," which brought tens of thousands of non-
governmental organization (NGO) representatives to Rio, and which
produced a very different, though equally voluminous, set of citizen
treaties.
Altogether these questions of enforceability, legitimacy, and sover-
eignty raise the preeminent, yet largely unmentioned, issue of responsibil-
ity Which institutions, individuals, and modes of activity are primarily
responsible for the unsustainability of existing development patterns? A
quick read of the United Nations resolutions suggests that rampant pro-
tectioism and overpopulation are among the principal culprits while the
alternative citizen treaties blame reckless transnational corporations,
overconsumption, and the military-industrial complex. These contrast-
ing perspectives obviously imply radically different policy responses. The
degree to which the policies of governments involved in the official nego-
tiations are themselves responsible for unsustamable development (or are
influenced by responsible parties in the public and private sectors) brings
the entire Summit process into question, regardless of whether the deci-
sion rules are consensual or authoritarian. If the same individuals who
have benefitted from unsustainable development also decide how to de-
fine and implement sustainable development, then clearly a conflict-of-
interest issue arises. Is it just for a group of individuals that directly
benefit from an activity deemed to be wrongful to judge whether it
should proceed or how it should be altered? Would this be allowed, for
example, in the American court system? The problem is exceedingly
complex. Whose hands are clean or at least sufficiently cleaner than
others to enable them to make relatively impartial decisions? How
would such individuals be empowered to make decisions? And if they
have not participated in devising and implementing existing development
decisions, will they have the expertise needed to decide on sustainable
options?
Without clear delineations of responsibility in the policy-making pro-
cess, it is impossible either to appoint or elect decision makers that are
appropriate to guide sustainable development or to allocate equitably the
rights and obligations that should follow Resolution of these issues is
fundamental to the proposed establishment of a new international body
called the Sustainable Development Commission. This high-level watch-
dog agency, modeled on the United Nations Human Rights Commission,
1992] EQUITY AND THE 1992 RIO EARTH SUMMIT 5
will reportedly rely on evidence gathered by private environmental
groups to "shame" countries into respecting the pledges they made at
Rio.9 Yet the new commission will not be empowered to develop new
policies or to impose fines or other sanctions against nations that violate
the existing agreements.' 0 Moreover, all of the issues raised here regard-
ing legitimacy and responsibility apply to influential environmental
groups, some of which have funding sources derived from existing unsus-
tainable practices.
Il. IMPACT EQUITY
The implications of these procedural issues for the equitability of the
resulting policy impacts are apparent in all of the documents prepared in
Rio. Agenda 21's reliance on trade liberalization as the key to sustaina-
ble development not only sounds like hollow rhetoric in the face of eco-
nomic and political realities around the world, it also reflects the interests
of the most influential parties involved in the consensus represented by
the official agreements. The lack of attention given to allocating respon-
sibility is nowhere clearer than in the area of atmospheric pollution. The
1987 Montreal Protocol limiting use of chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) that
deplete the ozone layer, a major precursor to the UNCED negotiations,
for example, asks southern countries to make the same reduction com-
mitments as northern countries that currently account for nearly 90% of
CFC use."1
The United Nations' frequently cited chain of causality, wich blames
the worst environmental problems on poverty, has led to a single-minded
emphasis on population control in poor countries, or in the vague words
of the Rio Declaration, the promotion of "appropriate demographic poli-
cies."' 2 Unlike the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, the alternative
NGO poverty treaty is more explicit in identifying responsibility for the
problem. The NGO treaty puts forth the following analysis: "the cen-
tralization of power to control natural resources causes, simultaneously,
poverty and environmental degradation."'" The NGO's alternative solu-
tion is thus not to control birth rates in southern countries where each
baby consumes thirty-four times less resources than infants born in the
North, but rather to democratize and decentralize political and economic
decision-making. As indicated by this example, any identification of re-
sponsibility has implications not only for the substance of corrective pol-
9. Paul Lewis, Delegates at Earth Summit Plan a Watch Dog Agency, N.Y TIMES,
June 7, 1992, at A20.
10. Id.
11. Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,
26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
12. Rio Declaration, supra note 6, at 3.
13. NGO Poverty Treaty (1992) (on file with the Fordham Environmental Law
Report).
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icy measures, but also for the procedures by which such policies are
derived.
The Biodiversity Convention provides another useful example. Presi-
dent Bush was castigated in the media worldwide because of his refusal
to sign the convention, which had the support of nearly all of the govern-
ments represented at the official UNCED talks. Bush's opposition stems
from provisions in the treaty that require sharing of benefits from prod-
ucts derived from biological and genetic resources with their countries of
origin, which would potentially have adverse effects on United States bio-
technology industry profits. 4 Yet Bush has some unlikely bedfellows in
opposition to the treaty: representatives of indigenous peoples and others
who live in developing countries with rain forests, where the widest van-
ety of plant and amnal species are thought to live. Representatives of
mese groups and NGO's at the Global Forum drafted an alternative bi-
odiversity treaty that contests the privatization of biological resources
altogether.'5 The alternative treaty states that such resources, "shall not
be the object of restrictions, or in any way be considered as intellectual
property," and that, "no patenting should be allowed on any living thing
or a product derived from it.' 16
Since this goal is unlikely to be reached, the strategic issue centers on
who will hold the rights to these resources. Despite Agenda 21's call for
"respecting the cultural integrity and the rights of indigenous people and
their communities,"' 7 the official United Nations treaty-making process
excludes native representation, and, not surprisingly, the Biodiversity
Convention's proposed distribution of benefits from these biological re-
sources fails to provide any explicit share for the indigenous inhabitants
of the forests. In short, the winners in this agreement are biotechnology
firms with existing stocks of germ plasms, and national governments like
Brazil, which have allowed their ram forests to be destroyed at ever-m-
creasing rates and which may benefit more in the future from whatever
biological resources still remain.
Forest dwellers, who have cared for the biodiversity of their habitats
for thousands of years, who often have the greatest scientific knowledge
of the species within their surroundings, and who generally alerted inter-
national researchers to their potential uses in the first place, had no voice
in these decisions and were not identified among the beneficiaries. Fu-
ture generations were treated similarly- for all the talk of patents and
benefit distributions, it remains unclear how these biological resources
will be preserved over the long run. The most heated dispute over
Agenda 21 involved financing the estimated costs of the proposed devel-
14. James Brooke, U.S. Has a Starrmng Role at Rio Summit as Villain, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 1992, at A10.
15. NGO Poverty Treaty, supra note 13.
16. Citizens Commitment on Biodiversity: Proposed Treaty (on file with the Fordham
Environmental Law Report).
17. Agenda 21, supra note 5, Part III, at 15.
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opment and environmental objectives."8 Maurice Strong, the UNCED
Secretary-General, estimated that for the South alone, such financing re-
quirements would total $625 billion per year. 9 Southern countries were
asked to provide $500 billion of this total; the remaining $125 billion to
come from mdustralized nations in the North.20 This represents $70
billion more than the current level of overseas development aid of $55
billion.2 The Sustainable Development Commission was charged with
monitoring progress toward the goal of achieving transfers from North
to South comprising 0.7% of the gross national product of industrialized
nations, a target that the United States has consistently resisted.22 De-
spite these goals, the United States, Europe, and Japan only agreed to
new pledges totalling $6 to $7 billion, or just 1% of the total annual costs
of the sustainable development goals outlined in Rio for developing
nations.23
These figures need to be put into context for their equity implications
to emerge. The United Nations estimates that net transfers from South
to North (combined with lost income from restricted access to northern
markets) reach $250 billion annually. 24 This is roughly double what
Strong requested from the North. Therefore, even if these goals were
met, nations most desperate for development initiatives to meet the basic
needs of their populations will still be transferring $125 billion to the
industrialized North, an indisputably regressive net effect. Moreover,
there was no accounting of the unmitigated environmental burdens cre-
ated by production in the North, the global effects of which impose addi-
tional costs on the South. The North generates the vast majority of
industrial pollutants, the environmental costs of which are likely to ex-
ceed by far the figures Strong advanced.25 Many of these pollutants have
long-term effects that will burden future generations as well as the pres-
ent global population. Yet there is no compensation allocated for these
voiceless victims.
In addition to the serious equity implications of financing sustainable
development, the Earth Summit raised equally serious implications for
the dispersal of these funds. Southern countries voiced major opposition
to the proposed control of these funds by the Global Environmental Fa-
cility (GEF) of the World Bank. Decision-making at the World Bank is
controlled by industrialized donor nations to the exclusion of recipient
developing nations. Hence the issue of procedural equity is prominent
here as well. Further, if the funding goals raised at the Earth Summit are
18. Agenda 21, supra note 5.
19. Yost, supra note 4, at 4.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Robert Weissman, Summit Games: Bush Busts UNCED, MULTINATIONAL MON-
ITOR, July/August, 1992, at 12.
24. Yost, supra note 4, at 6 n. 11.
25. Yost, supra note 4, at 4.
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ever expanded to include an environmental trust to compensate future
generations for damages from unsustainable development, which would
seem to be necessitated by the concept of sustainability itself, who will
represent their interests m the collection and dispersal of such funds?
CONCLUSION
To some extent the 1992 Earth Summit represents the advance of real-
ism over the lofty aspirations of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, which took place in Stockholm twenty years
before and set the stage for the events in Rio.26 In Stockholm there was
still widespread optimism about the potential for traditional development
in the South. Yet the interim twenty years of international development
policies has created a world with even greater levels of inequality and
human and environmental devastation. In Rio, representatives of mdus-
trialized nations were no longer encouraging developing countries to con-
sider their natural biodiversity as part of a "global heritage." Instead, all
nations present were aggressively staking out their shares of the rights in
and royalties from these dwindling resources. While many may view the
privatization of such natural assets with alarm and may not agree with
the distributions set forth in Rio, the crucial issue of equity, both within
and between generations, was indelibly brought to the forefront of public
debate.
Yet for all of the rhetoric, including Agenda 21's pledge to "to make
international trade and environment policies mutually supportive in
favor of sustainable development,"27 the Earth Summit agreements pro-
vide little guarantee that global decision-making processes and impacts
will be more equitable in the future. It seems that the key issue the Earth
Summit raises for legal scholars and practitioners is in defining principles
of justice that should apply to the nexus of global environmental and
development issues and identifying equitable procedures for translating
such principles into international law
26. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972).
27. Agenda 21, supra note 5.
